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The article is devoted to the historical inquiry of the Dhofar Rebellion of 
1963–1976 which was important stage of the historical development of the 
Sultanate of Oman. It has been stressed that the background of the 
rebellion determined by complex combination of political, economic and 
ethnic factors. The main reason for the support of the local mountain 
population of Karra and Kathiri for NDFLOAG (the National Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf) was not 
revolutionary sentiments but ethnic problems. The Jebel Samkhan 
highlanders were not part of the tribal structure of Oman and had no place 
in the political elite. It has been concluded that Dhofar received its current 
status as a result of the Dhofar rebellion. The rebellion was the final and the 
most important stage in the policy of Sultan bin Said. After it Oman became 
a single state. The Dhofar Liberation Front remained an independent 
organization in Oman (based in London). It pursues the same policy but 
does not speak openly.  
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The Dhofar Rebellion (1963–1976) also known as the War in Dhofar or 
the Omani Civil War played an important role in the history of Oman and 
also the British history. In the 1960–1970s the British together with local 
allies fought a stubborn struggle against representatives of the insurgency 
in the Omani province of Dhofar. The local separatist movement soon 
gained support from left-wing groups in neighboring Yemen, which caused 
concern among the British and the subsequent dispatch of troops there 
from Britain. The war in Dhofar threatened to turn into “Arab Vietnam” and 
caused the downfall of sheikhs and emirs, allies of the United States and 
Great Britain.  
The paper will aim at investigating of the historical and political aspects 
of the Dhofar Rebellion as final and most important stage of Sultan Said bin 
Taimur’s policy.   
This investigation is based on the works of the representatives both 
historical and political fields of scientific knowledge. Among them should be 
mentioned I. Aleksandrov [1], Jr. Allen and H. Calvin [2], R. El-Solh [3], J. 
Jones [4], B. Korany, P. Noble, and R. Brynen [6], S. Plekhanov [7], and 
others. In spite of rather wide range of investigations of history and politics 
of Oman many aspects of the Dhofar Rebellion of 1963–1976 are still 
largely unexplored.   
In 1962 Oman was a very underdeveloped country. Sultan Said bin 
Taimur – an absolute ruler under British influence had outlawed almost all 
technological development and relied on British support to maintain the 
rudimentary functions of the state. Dhofar itself depended of Oman but was 
culturally and linguistically distinct from Oman proper. 
In the 19th century representatives of the Al-Said dynasty concluded 
beneficial agreements with the British government enlisting the support of 
the British in repelling external and internal threats. One of the dangers 
came precisely from the interior of the country or “true” Oman where in the 
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1860s the tradition of electing local spiritual leaders – imams was revived 
and the power of the Muscat sultans virtually disappeared. Largely thanks 
to the presence of the British fleet it was possible to hold the coast which 
was important for the control of the Strait of Hormuz and the western part of 
the Indian Ocean. The British went to it in order to secure their possessions 
in Hindustan. In the 1940–1950s Sultan Said bin Taimur managed with 
significant support from the British army to annex back the Imamate of 
Oman which has already become an independent state that has 
established foreign policy ties with Saudi Arabia and received a place in the 
League of Arab States.  
By the early 1960s the rule of the imams in “true” Oman was done 
away with but the last imam and his supporters fled to Saudi Arabia from 
where they openly threatened the rulers of Muscat. Meanwhile a new 
hotbed of tension has emerged in the Dhofar region which lies in the south 
of the Sultanate on the border with Yemen. Dhofar was on the sidelines 
during the conflict between the imam and the Sultan, there were no 
hostilities although many people from this province served in the newly 
formed units of the Sultan’s army trained by British instructors.  
Dissatisfaction with the Sultan’s policies ultimately provoked an 
uprising of several leaders of the local Arab tribes led by Musallim bin Nafl. 
He and his supporters attacked government troops seized part of the oil 
produced but under pressure from superior enemy forces was forced to flee 
to Saudi Arabia. The leaders of the latter were hostile towards Said bin 
Taimur since he was the first to capture an important oasis in the oil-bearing 
region on the border of the states. In exile Musallim bin Nafl formed the 
Dhofar Liberation Front which with some support from Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia began a guerrilla war in the province. In 1968 it joined to the Bahrain 
National Liberation Front and began to be called the National Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG). 
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The main reason for the support of the local mountain population of 
Karra and Kathiri for NDFLOAG was not revolutionary sentiments but ethnic 
problems. The Jebel Samkhan highlanders were not part of the tribal 
structure of Oman and had no place in the political elite. 
The ideologues of the NDFLOAG developed a revolutionary theory 
and invented a new revolutionary class – the Bedouintariate. These were 
young “kabili” – people who left their tribes. They had nothing to lose and 
they were the most progressive revolutionary class in the Arabian 
Peninsula. The ideologues – “Adu” (“enemies”, the common name for 
NDFLOAG fighters) were trained in Yemen. Ideological work took primitive 
forms. A. Vasiliev in his book [8] described a “demonstration” in one of the 
mountain villages of Dhofar. The militant Adu with a submachine gun lined 
up the entire population of the village and shouted slogans to the peasants 
– about the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Lenin, Marxism-
Leninism, etc., which the peasants loudly chanted in chorus, hardly knowing 
what this is about [8, p. 75]. At the same time the activities of the partisans 
who opened schools, tried to provide medical and veterinary care, aroused 
sympathy from the ranchers, many of whom still lived in caves. 
Dhofar at this time was divided into four zones. The western zone and 
the neighboring zone of Ho Chi Minh were controlled by Adu. There was a 
front line on the “red line” a guerrilla war was going on in the eastern zone 
[7, p. 66].  
The first step of the Sultan was to spread in Dhofar information about 
the amnesty for the participants in the armed struggle. Radio stations were 
broadcasting on Dhofar where the Sultan’s decree on amnesty was passed 
on to the militants, leaflets were dropped from planes. Already in August 
1970 about 200 Adu militants descended from the mountains. On the basis 
of the militants who surrendered under the amnesty from the Dzhebali 
(highlanders), the Sultan began to form the firkat (anti-partisan 
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commandos). Firkat actions were effective because their fighters knew how 
to fight in the mountains, and also knew the routes of the partisans, the 
locations of their warehouses, etc. [2, p. 165].  
The strategy of the anti-partisan war was also changed. Prior to that 
with the onset of the harif (monsoon season) when it became impossible to 
use aviation, the forces of the SAF (Sultan’s army) left the mountains, 
returned to the Salalah plain. Now it was decided to create zones of 
constant control of the SAF and gradually expand them. The first successful 
operation was the seizure of the port town of Sadakh in the west of the 
country by a firkat detachment. 
Measures to win the sympathy of the local population were the supply 
of food to the highlanders through the firkat. Prizes were also awarded for 
the surrender of Soviet weapons which were armed with Adu (Kalashnikov 
assault rifles, Simonov and Degtyarev rifles). 
Nevertheless the first firkat detachment of several dozen fighters 
created in February 1971 disintegrated due to contradictions between 
representatives of various Jabali clans without even entering a battle. When 
forming subsequent units tribal principles were taken into account. 
There was also a powerful propaganda and agitation campaign. This 
was how the sale of transistor receivers at very low prices in the market-
places was organized so that the population could listen to the programs of 
the loyalist Radio Salalah leaflets were dropped from planes, hung on 
notice boards at checkpoints. The main emphasis in these materials was 
made on the atheism of the communists, on the fact that they are the 
enemies of Islam. 
Simultaneously with the firkat Civic Aid Teams were organized to dig 
wells, distribute food, and organize primary health care. In the zones of 
government control, they began to build roads, conduct electricity, open 
schools and mosques [3, p. 64]. 
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During this period Adu changed they political orientation from China to 
the USSR. The USSR had incomparably greater capabilities to help the 
partisans than China, which in the early 1970s was on the brink of 
economic disaster. But it was also connected with the events in neighboring 
Yemen where as a result of political struggle came to power “supporters of 
scientific socialism”, a pro-Soviet group. Through Yemen the USSR 
transferred to Adu Shpagin’s large-caliber machine guns, light 60-mm 
mortars, portable missile systems, anti-aircraft guns, and many automatic 
small arms. 
Feeling the weakening of support for their struggle by the people of 
Dhofar Adu unleashed a mass terror, now killing everyone who was critical 
of their policies including the representatives of the working people [6, p. 
82].  
The weakening of Adu’s positions was also the result of a change in 
the international situation – since 1970 a sharp “correction” of a number of 
regimes in Arab countries began. 
As a result the internationalization of the conflict began. Hussein – the 
King of Jordan sent his instructors and pilots to the SAF (trained by Soviet 
instructors in their time). A battalion of Jordanian paratroopers was 
stationed in Tamrit which controlled the road linking the Dhofar Plateau with 
Salalah. Thus, the partisans were deprived of the opportunity to expand the 
area of their actions. Egyptian military advisers also appeared. They were 
also trained by Soviet instructors at the time. 
By November 1971 the Sultan’s troops had regained full control over 
the Red Zone and the Eastern Zone. In November 1971 a chain of fortified 
points was built in the “red zone” between which minefields were arranged. 
This defensive line became known as the Leopard Line. By May 1972 5AR 
units in pursuit of the partisans were already entering Yemen. In June 1970 
– May 1972 more than 110 incursions by Omani (that is, in fact, British) 
Paradigm of Knowledge № 4(42), 2020 
 
 
aviation were committed into Yemeni airspace. 5AR aircrafts struck targets 
in Yemeni territory.  
The government of the NDFLOAG has made a formal request to 
Whitehall regarding the involvement of British 5AR troops in operations in 
Yemen. However, the British Foreign Office spokesman denied the 
participation of the British army in such actions but did not rule out that the 
5AR ranks may include British citizens who served in the British army. But 
they fight as mercenaries [1, p. 57]. 
However, in the summer of 1972 during the harif the Sultan’s units 
retreated from the Leopard Line, as they lost their air supplies. The 
partisans attacked the Mirbat fortress at the foot of the northern slopes of 
Jebel Samhan. It was the largest battle of the war which began on July 19, 
1972. Just as the guerrillas broke through the line of barbed wire “5AR 
Strikemasters” appeared in the sky and launched a missile attack on 
clusters of militants after which helicopters landed paratroopers. 
As it turned out later, this major action was a gesture of despair on the 
part of Adu. They intended to capture the city for at least a few hours, 
execute vali and rich citizens who were active supporters of the Sultan, and 
intimidate the residents as much as possible. A large-scale act of 
intimidation was envisaged upon learning of which the population would be 
afraid to support the Sultan and would discard the idea of leaving the war. 
However, everything happened the other way around – Adu left about 100 
dead on the battlefield, about the same number later died of wounds in 
primitive mountain hospitals. 
Adu as typical political sectarians began searching for “scapegoats” 
responsible for the failure of the operation; a number of “revolutionary 
tribunals” were held over the alleged perpetrators [5, p. 219–220]. But in 
fact Adu’s mistake was that they were completely sure that during the harif 
not a single plane or helicopter would be able to take off. They did not take 
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into account that the technology was constantly being improved. After that 
the Hornbeam Line was built from the coast inland of Dhofar consisting of 
barbed wire, minefields, and sangars (boulder checkpoints).  
To provide military assistance to Iran in the Dhofar Rebellion the 
Sultan made territorial concessions handing over to Iran three small islands 
in the navigable part of the Persian Gulf. Despite the fact that these islands 
were just rocks protruding from the sea, they had a strategic value – by 
placing military bases on them, Iran could block navigation in the Persian 
Gulf – one of the busiest shipping areas in the world. 
On December 23, 1973, 3,000 Iranian paratroopers supported by an 
English airborne battalion and British aviation launched an offensive in 
Dhofar. For the partisans the landing of the airborne assault was a surprise 
since there was no airborne force in the SAF. 
The war in Dhofar consumed great resources. Up to 47% of the total 
budget was spent on military spending. At the same time the Sultan not 
trusting the tribes of Oman formed his army from Baloch mercenaries (up to 
70% of the entire army) [9, p. 184]. 
According to Soviet researchers Dhofar then found itself in the 
conditions of a military, economic and political blockade. But in fact, the 
ultra-left Omani revolutionaries made a number of tactical mistakes. So 
Adu’s voluntaristic decision “abolished the tribes” in Dhofar. Tribal pastures 
and water sources were declared the property of the whole people. After 
that part of the tribes under the influence of their sheikhs began to tend to a 
compromise with the enemy. Because of this the Adu units formed on a 
non-tribal basis began to lose their combat effectiveness – the fighters 
stopped trusting each other. A number of mistakes were made during the 
anti-religious campaign. A breeding ground for atheism was the 6-year 
Lenin school in Yemen, near the border. Teachers which were trained in the 
Warsaw Bloc countries worked there. At the same time it must be 
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emphasized once again that Adu and their allies sought to attract the 
population not only with ideological slogans. Thus, in the Hauf region 
(Yemen, near the border with Oman) a modern Cuban hospital was 
deployed where not only the wounded Adu were treated but also the civilian 
population of Dhofar. For people for whom the only method of treatment for 
almost all diseases was cauterization with a hot iron the effect of even the 
simplest antibiotics seemed a real miracle [9, p. 187]. 
A feature of the anti-partisan struggle in Dhofar was that the 
government forces did not pursue the goal of inflicting maximum damage 
on the enemy. The main goal was to win the hearts and minds of the 
militants. Therefore, the means of the anti-guerrilla warfare arsenal were 
used very limitedly –for example, they never poisoned water sources, did 
not place “mine-stretchers” so that none of the civilian population would 
suffer, so as not to anger even more militants [5, p. 329–330].   
The congress of the NDFLOAG in June 1974 decided in the changed 
situation to remove the task of a regional revolution in the Persian Gulf and 
to create a wide the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). The 
task of socialist transformations was also removed. NDFLOAG now set 
itself only the task of eliminating military bases and withdrawing foreign 
troops from the country, fighting against the “Iranian invaders”. An 
absolutely untimely decision was made to create a regular army NDFLOAG. 
The Omani “ultra-left” continued to make mistakes in the “Soviet 
construction”. So, private trade was prohibited. In the conditions of the 
blockade of Dhofar an equal distribution of food rations was introduced. 
However, let us remember that a significant part of the land fund, the lands 
of the fled feudal lords, were abandoned – the poor Karr were afraid to take 
them for themselves and cultivate them. Due to the fighting the irrigation 
system was destroyed and not restored. The Adu were no longer able to 
provide the population with food, even with ration cards. 
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Yemen could not provide assistance in this regard, since there the 
“building of socialism” led to the same problems. Adu tried to solve the 
problem, as in Yemen – by socializing property and creating “cooperatives” 
modeled on Soviet collective farms. In general, there was nothing new in 
collective property for Karr, but one must remember that the Adu “abolished 
the tribes” and cooperatives were founded from representatives of different 
clans, which simply did not fit into the psychology of local residents in terms 
of the attitude to property. This is a vivid example of “left-wing excesses” 
typical for Omani revolutionaries – even in the USSR during collectivization 
in a number of national regions, such factors were taken into account, for 
example, in Chechnya and Dagestan. The local population was also 
annoyed by the endless meetings, rallies, and political education filled with 
obscure political demagogy. Even Kabili began to turn away from Adu. At 
the same time the Sultan managed to invite hundreds of nurses, doctors, 
teachers, hydrologists from Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan to use oil revenues. 
The water problem was successfully solved by drilling artesian wells 
(several hundred of them were drilled). 
By November 1974 the insurgents had been completely driven west of 
the Hornbeam Line. Firkat combed the vadi and caves of Dhofar where the 
partisans set up warehouses, hospitals and bases. In January 1975 as a 
result of a joint operation of the Iranian paratroopers and the Sultan’s fleet 
the capital of the “liberated region” – the port village of Rahyut was 
captured. The Adu sea supply route was cut. After that construction began 
on the Demavend Line 35–40 km west of Hornbeam.  
In January-February 1975 the SAF established control over the main 
militant bases in vadi Shershitti, Ashauk, and Guiper. During all this time the 
partisans undertook only one retaliatory action – a rocket and mortar attack 
on Sarfait in honor of the decade of the revolution on June 9, 1975. The 
“Simba Line” was already in close proximity to the border with Yemen, from 
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which shelling of Omani territory became more frequent [4, p. 111–115]. On 
October 16, 1975, Omani Hauker Hunter attack aircraft attacked the 
Yemeni town of Haufa, destroying the headquarters of Adu, a police station 
and artillery positions. The Sultan feared that this would become a pretext 
for a war with Yemen. However, this did not happen, since Yemen at that 
time developed extremely tense relations with the Yemen Arab Republic, 
and inside the country there was a struggle between Nasserites and 
supporters of “scientific socialism”. The remaining Adu group was cut off 
from the border with Yemen by the “Simba line” and surrounded in a gorge. 
The partisans were threatened with total destruction. However, the Yemeni 
government asked the Sultan to provide a corridor to escape the 
encirclement for 200 of its soldiers who were in the ranks of Adu. The 
partisans also left Oman along the corridor leaving, however, all their heavy 
weapons. 
The rebellion was declared suppressed in January 1976, although 
isolated incidents took place until late 1979.  
Thus, as a result of the rebellion Dhofar received its current status. The 
rebellion was the final stage in the policy of Sultan bin Said. After it Oman 
became a single state. The Dhofar Liberation Front remained an 
independent organization in Oman (based in London). It pursues the same 
policy but does not speak openly. 
 
References: 
1. Aleksandrov, I. А. [Melikhov, I. А.] (2000). Monarchies of the Persian 
Gulf: the Stage of Modernization. Moscow: Delo i servis, 544. [in 
Russian]. 
2. Allen, Jr., Calvin, H. (1987). Oman: The Modernization of the 
Sultanate. Colorado, Westview Press, 168.  
Paradigm of Knowledge № 4(42), 2020 
 
 
3. El-Solh, R. (1997). Oman and the South-Eastern Shore of Arabia. 
Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 336. (Archive Documents on the History of the 
Arab World Series). 
4. Jones, J. (2007). Negotiating the Change: The New Politics of the 
Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 224. 
5. Jеареs, Т. (2000). SAS: Secret War. N.Y.: Наrper Соllins, 253.  
6. Korany, B., Noble, P., Brynen, R. (1993). The Many Faces of National 
Security in the Arab World. N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 322.  
7. Plekhanov, S. N. (2003). Reformer on the throne. Sultan of Oman 
Qaboos bin Said. Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 288. [in 
Russian].  
8. Vasiliev, А. (1977). The Difficult Pass. Moscow: Nauka, 304. [in 
Russian].  
9. Vorobiov, N. N. (1984). The Role of Tribes in the Socio-Economic Life 
of Oman (1950–1980): State Power and Socially-Political Structures in 
Arab Countries. History and Modernity. Moscow: Nauka, 182–187. [in 
Russian].  
 
